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Universal v. Sony: Is Home Use
in Fact Fair Use?
By JUDITH BARKAN*
Introduction
A California federal district court judge recently handed down a
decision' declaring that noncommercial home videotaping of copy-
righted material was "fair use"2 under the United States copyright
laws.
Universal City Studios, Inc. and Walt Disney Productions
brought the suit in November, 1976, against the Sony Corpora-
tion,' manufacturer of the Betamax home videotape recorder; its
distributor, Sony Corporation of America; its advertising agency;5
four retail stores;* and one consumer.7 At issue was the extent of
* Member, Third Year Class
1. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal.
1979).
2. Fair use is the use of copyrighted material by judicial permission, without authoriza-
tion by the copyright holder. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. III 1979). See text accompanying notes
34-83, infra.
3. Throughout this note, "Universal" will denote both plaintiffs, i.e., Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc. and Walt Disney Productions.
4. Throughout this note, "Sony" will denote all defendants.
5. Doyle Dane Bernbach, Inc.
6. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., Henry's Camera Corporation, Associated Dry Goods
Corporation and Federated Department Stores, Inc.
Universal admitted that it had neither suffered nor anticipated suffering harm as a result
of the retailers' demonstration copying. However, the studio asserted that sales of the
Betamax rendered the retail stores liable for contributory infringement. See text accompa-
nying note 120, infra.
7. The consumer, William Griffiths, was a client of the plaintiffs' law firm. He consented
to being a defendant in the suit, and all claims for damages or costs against him were
waived. He was not represented by counsel in the action. 480 F. Supp. at 437. This proce-
dure seems questionable at best, and one commentator suggested that the case could have
been dismissed on grounds of collusion. See Comment, Betamax and Infringement of Tele-
vision Copyright, 6 DuKE L.J. 1181, 1184 n.16 (1977), pointing out that under 28 U.S.C. §
1359 (1970), the district court could be held to lack jurisdiction: "A district court shall not
have jurisdiction of a civil action in which any party . . . has been improperly or collusively
. . . joined."
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protection offered by the Copyright Acts of 19098 and 19769 to au-
diovisual material voluntarily broadcast over the public airwaves.
On October 2, 1979," United States District Court Judge War-
ren J. Ferguson ruled that noncommercial home recording of mate-
rial broadcast over the public airwaves is not copyright infringe-
ment." He denied Universal and Disney's requests for injunctive
and declaratory relief, damages and profits, and held that Sony
had neither competed unfairly with the studios nor unlawfully and
intentionally interfered with their contractual and advantageous
business relationships. He also determined that none of the retail
or corporate defendants were directly,"' contributorily 4 or vicari-
ously" liable for home-use copying.'
Owners and potential owners of videorecorders (VTRs) wel-
comed the decision; Universal and Disney are appealing it. If the
ruling is upheld, the studios face at least major changes in market-
ing" and, arguably, the loss of considerable profits because of the
8. Ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
9. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-801 (Supp. III 1979).
10. The decision was amended on December 5, 1979.
11. Copyright infringement is the "[u]nauthorized use of copyrighted material; i.e., use
without permission of the copyright holder." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 702 (5th ed. 1979).
12. 480 F. Supp. at 469. Plaintiffs have contracted with national television networks, vari-
ous independent television stations, pay television systems, and various independent third
parties, granting them the right to exhibit copyrighted motion pictures one or more times.
The contracts are the result of "longstanding and continuing business dealings" and plain-
tiffs charge that the defendants knew of the existence of the contracts and business relation-
ships and acted with the intent to injure and otherwise interfere with them. Plaintiffs'
Memorandum of Contentions of Fact and Law at 38-39.
13. Sony was charged with directly infringing not by making allegedly infringing copies of
Universal's works, but rather by furnishing and/or advertising Betamax to the public with
the purpose or expectation that purchasers of the recorder would infringe the copyrighted
materials. Plaintiffs' Opening Post-Trial Memorandum at 11. While there is support for
such a theory (see text accompanying notes 106-07, infra), the more common understanding
of direct infringement involves an actual copying of protected material by the party charged
with infringement.
14. See text accompanying note 120, infra.
15. See text accompanying note 110, infra.
16. 480 F. Supp. at 469.
17. For example, with respect to advertising, current practices are based on demographic
studies which allow advertisers to reach target audiences. The ability of VTR owners to
"time-shift"-i.e., create their own television schedules by taping one program while watch-
ing another, or while away from home, for viewing at nonscheduled times-thus reduces the
effectiveness of advertising campaigns.
Additionally, advertisers cannot be assured that their commercials will reach viewers at a
"meaningful time"-e.g., before an advertised event takes place-or that viewers will not
use VTR capabilities to avoid commercials entirely. Plaintiffs' Opening Post-Trial Memo-
randum at 136-37, 139. See note 18, infra.
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reluctance of advertisers to pay large sums for reruns of theatrical
and television productions."
The district court's decision in favor of the corporate'defendants
in Universal v. Sony is based largely on its interpretation of the
doctrine of fair use. 19 This note Will suggest that the court's reli-
ance on the doctrine was inappropriate and invites opposite results
in ensuing cases. Fair use is a defense to the charge of copyright
infringement.20 Whether or not a use is "fair" is an issue only
where there has been unauthorized copying of protected works.
Judge Ferguson, citing statutory interpretation and legislative in-
tent, held that noncommercial home-use videotaping was not an
infringing activity.21 As such, it required no justification: copyright
law had not been violated; home taping was not an unauthorized
copying. Nevertheless, the district court went on to apply the fair
use factors" and characterize home-use videotaping as a fair use
under copyright law.
This writer agrees with the district court's holding based on leg-
islative history that home-use videotaping is not copyright in-
fringement but questions the court's ruling that the total appropri-
ation of copyrighted works is "fair." It is submitted that courts in
the future could decide that such appropriation is not exempt and
that it exceeds the bounds of fair use. 8 In this context, the note
explores the historical basis of copyright protection and the doc-
trine of fair use, and concludes that the Copyright Act should be
While Judge Ferguson acknowledged that "[tihe Betamax and other technological ad-
vances will undoubtedly change the industry and introduce new considerations into plain-
tiffs' marketing considerations," he concluded "[clopyright law. . . does not protect authors
from change or new considerations in the marketing of their products. As the Supreme
Court stated in Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.: 'While secur-
ing compensation to the holders of copyright was an essential purpose of that Act, freezing
existing economic arrangements for doing so was not.'" 480 F. Supp. at 452 (citations
omitted).
18. See text accompanying note 93, infra. VTRs feature remote control pause buttons
that allow viewers to delete commercials when recording and fast forward buttons that allow
them to skip over commercials on playback.
19. See text accompanying notes 34-83, infra.
20. It is interesting to note that in Universal v. Sony, Sony asserted a defense of fair use
although it was neither charged with copying nor did it admit to copying. Rather, Sony was
charged with providing the instrumentality with which members of the public made copies
that allegedly infringed the plaintiffs' works. Because Sony could have been held directly,
contributorily or vicariously liable for the acts of Betamax owners, it was able to raise the
defenses available to such owners.
21. 480 F. Supp. at 442, 469.
22. See text accompanying note 40, infra.
23. See note 54, infra.
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amended to include the home exemption implied in its legislative
history. Such an amendment would remove the issue of total ap-
propriation from the judicial arena and realize the intent of Con-
gress and the Copyright Office that home-use recording be free
from liability.
I
Rights Granted to Copyright Owners by Copyright
Law
Copyright law has its origin in the constitutional grant of power
to Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts," by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." The
federal Copyright Act of 19765 protects copyrightable works2
from the moment they are fixed'7 "in any tangible medium of ex-
pression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly
or with the aid of a machine or device."" Almost all works pro-
tected by the current act, i.e., works created on or after January 1,
1978, are protected for the life of the author and fifty years follow-
ing his or her death."
24. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The first American copyright law was enacted in 1790,
and has been generally revised four times-in 1831, 1870, 1909 and 1976.
25. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-801 (Supp. III 1979). Enacted on October 19, 1976, the current Act
took effect on January 1, 1978.
26. In order to qualify for copyright protection, a work must be an "original work of au-
thorship"-i.e., it must be independently created. The standard of originality is minimal;
the work need not be novel and, in fact, can be substantially similar or even identical to a
previous work. As Judge Learned Hand said in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,
81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936), af'd, 309 U.S. 390 (1940), "if by some magic a man who had
never known it were to compose anew Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an 'au-
thor,' and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they might of
course copy Keats's [which is in the public domain]." See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01
(1980)(hereinafter NIMMER).
27. "A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy
or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable
to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more
than transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being trans-
mitted, is 'fixed' for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultane-
ously with its transmission." 17 U.S.C. § 101.
28. 17 U.S.C. § 102. Under the Copyright Act of 1909, publication rather than fixation
was the trigger for statutory protection. A work is published by the sale or distribution, or
authorized offer to sell or distribute, either the original work or tangible copies thereof to
the general public. See 1 NIMMER § 4.04. The concept of publication retains vitality under
the Copyright Act of 1976. See 1 NIMMER § 4.01.
29. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). Joint works are covered for the life of the last surviving author and
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Copyright owners are granted certain exclusive rights, subject to
limiting provisions within the act. Section 106 enumerates these
rights, which include:
1. reproduction of the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords;
2. preparation of derivative works based on the copyrighted
work;
3. distribution of copies or phondrecords of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by
rental, lease or lending;
4. public performance of copyrighted literary, musical, dramatic,
and choreographic works, pantomimes, motion pictures and other
audiovisual works; and
5. public display of copyrighted literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculp-
tural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work.o
These grants of exclusive rights appear to give the copyright
propietor complete monopoly over his or her work in the areas
specified for the protectible period. However, the rights of the au-
thor are ultimately subordinated to the public good:
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private
motivation most ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for
an "author's" creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this in-
centive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good."'
50 years after his or her death. 17 U.S.C. § 302(b). Works for hire, pseudonymous works and
anonymous works are covered for 75 years from the date of first publication. 17 U.S.C. §
302(c). For works created before January 1, 1978, see 17 U.S.C. § 304.
30. See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
31. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)(footnote omitted).
See also Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1931): "The sole interest of the United
States and the primary object in conferring the [copyright] monopoly lie in the general ben-




Exemptions to Copyright Monopoly Created by the
Doctrine of Fair Use
The goal of copyright law is "to advance public welfare through
the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts'.""
Therefore, since copyright law grants a monopoly to authors, statu-
tory exemptions"3 to this monopoly allow greater public access to
copyrighted works. One of the most elusive of these statutory ex-
emptions, the judicially-created doctrine of fair use, played an in-
tegral part in Universal v. Sony. "[S]o flexible as virtually to defy
definition,"3 ' courts have called the doctrine "the most trouble-
some in the whole law of copyright."36 It allows a person in some
instances to use a copyrighted work without the consent or remu-
neration of its owner, and when properly invoked can be a defense
to a charge of copyright infringement. By limiting the scope of the
copyright owner's monopoly, the doctrine of fair use "offers a
means of balancing the exclusive rights of a copyright holder with
the public's interest in dissemination of information affecting areas
of universal concern, such as art, science and industry." As one
commentator on the law of copyright noted, "[t]he world goes
ahead because each of us builds on the work of our predecessors.
'A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant can see farther than
the giant himself.' Progress would be stifled if the author had a
complete monopoly of everything in his book. . . .
Section 107 of the current Copyright Act codifies the fair use
doctrine. It states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a
32. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1953): "The economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the
talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts'."
33. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-12 for limitations on the exclusive rights of copyright
proprietors.
34. Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). How-
ever, one definition is often noted with approval by both the courts and commentators:
"Fair use may be defined as a privilege in others than the owner of a copyright to use the
copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent, notwithstanding the mo-
nopoly granted to the owner by the copyright." H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITER-
ARY PROPERTY 260 (1944).
35. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104.F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
36. Wainwright Securities Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978).
37. Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUm. L. REV. 503, 511 (1945).
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copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism," comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or re-
search, is not an infringement of copyright.3' In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use
the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela-
tion to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.'s
That the doctrine is intended to be read expansively is illus-
trated by this statement from the legislative history of section 107:
The statement of the fair use doctrine in section 107 offers
some guidance to users in determining when the principles of the
doctrine apply. However, the endless variety of situations and
combinations of circumstances that can rise [sic] in particular
cases precludes the formulation of exact rules in the statute. The
bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doc-
trine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine
in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological
change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair
use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be
free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-
case basis. Section 107 is intended to restate the present judicial
doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow or enlarge it in any
way.41
38. The defense is uniformly accepted for criticism and review. See Hill v. Whalen &
Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1914); Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir.
1956), af'd by an equally divided court sub nom. CBS, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43
(1958).
39. For cases illustrating such uses of the defense, see Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publica-
tions, Inc., 246 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957); Oxford Book Co.
v. College Entrance Book Co., 98 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1938); Chautauqua School of Nursing v.
National School of Nursing, 238 F. 151 (2d Cir. 1916); Norman v. CBS, Inc., 333 F. Supp.
788 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Thompson v.
Gernsback, 94 F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
41. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976); S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 62 (1975). See also Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445
F. Supp. 875, 880 (S.D. Fla. 1978): "[T]he open ended quality of the judicial 'fair use' doc-
trine was intentionally preserved by the framers of the new act . .. in order to accommo-
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Copyright itself has been called "the metaphysics of the law,""'
and fair use is one of the most elusive principles embodied in that
metaphysics. Courts have called various forms and degrees of copy-
ing "fair use";" however, never before Universal v. Sony has the
doctrine been interpreted so expansively as to exempt from liabil-
ity the reproduction of entire copyrighted works. While research
into past cases reveals no factual precedent to Sony, it is instruc-
tive to consider the areas in which the defense traditionally has
been found appropriate and observe the judicial limits set in bal-
ancing the rights of copyright proprietors against those of the
public.
Fair Use Cases
Whether or not a defendant's use of a plaintiff's work is "fair" is
a question of fact. As the district court stated in Columbia Pic-
tures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co.," "[t]he amount of ma-
terial, both quantitatively and qualitatively, which may be used
without liability for infringement within the doctrine of fair use
will vary in any given case in accordance with the variations in the
factors to be considered in applying that doctrine."4 5
As noted above, section 107 of the current Copyright Act enu-
merates the four traditional "factors to be considered."46 As a codi-
fication of past case law they are, by definition," illustrative of
date the perpetually unsettled quality associated with the technological production and dis-
semination of ideas, products and artistic creations. The fluidity built into the statutory fair
use exception is premised on the flux which is endemic to the means of transmission-not
the substance transmitted. The fluidity built into the statute was designed to diminish the
difficulty which arises when an innovation in technology makes possible new techniques of
display that could not be contemplated by legislators in the year the statute was framed"
(emphasis in original).
42. By Justice Joseph Story in Folsom v. Marsh, No. 4,901, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C. Mass.
1841).
43. For example, the unauthorized use of copyrighted material where no infringement was
found has been called "fair use" (Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 246 F.2d 598
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957), as has the taking of material which was itself
uncopyrightable (Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936), afJ'd,
309 U.S. 390 (1940). In such instances, as in Universal v. Sony, employment of the doctrine
is unnecessary because no copying has taken place. "Fair use" has at times referred to a
"technical infringement" which by its nature was excused (Holdredge v. Knight Publ. Corp.,
214 F. Supp. 921 (S.D. Cal. 1963)), and to instances where the owner was held to have
impliedly consented to the taking (Mura v. CBS, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)).
44. 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
45. Id. at 354.
46. See text accompanying note 40, supra.
47. The preamble to section 107 states that "the factors to be considered shall include,"
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past uses of copyrighted material held to be fair, and they provide
the general standards by which the defense will be judged." How-
ever, fair use is not necessarily limited to factual situations which
fit neatly within the section 107 guidelines. The factors are not ab-
stract principles to be considered alone or in a vacuum; separate
but not discrete, they are tools for balancing the competing rights
of the public and the copyright owner."
Examination of fair use cases reveals that two of the four factors
predominate. The first, "the purpose and character of the use, in-
cluding whether such a use is of a commercial nature or is for non-
profit educational purposes,"50 seeks to further the progress of the
arts and useful sciences. It allows reasonable uses of copyrighted
material which further the public interest in free dissemination of
information and the incorporation of such material in subsequent
works in fields such as science, law, medicine and history." The
second, "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work,"52 addresses the economic incentive
offered the author to produce. These two factors embody the con-
flicting goals of copyright law-i.e., public access and private in-
centive-and more often than not courts resolve fair use cases by
weighing and balancing them. The remaining factors, "the nature
of the copyrighted work"53 and "the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,""
and section 101 of the current Act directs that "the terms 'including' and 'such as' are
illustrative and not limitative." (emphasis added).
48. See 3 NIMMER § 13.05[A].
49. See Freid, Fair Use and the New Act, 22 N.Y.L.ScH. L. Rev. 497 (1977) (reprinted in
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE NEW COPYRIGHT LAW
205 (1977)).
50. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
51. See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir.
1966).
52. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
53. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2). The "nature" of a copyrighted work is determined by such consid-
erations as its availability through normal channels of commerce and whether it is being
reproduced in its own market, e.g., "[tlext books and other material prepared primarily for
the school markets would be less susceptible to reproduction for classroom use than mate-
rial prepared for general public distribution." S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 64
(1975).
54. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3). Traditionally, copying of entire works has not been allowed. See
Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962)(choir director rearranged copyrighted hymn for
choral use); Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by an equally divided
court sub nom. CBS, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958)(serious dramatic work, though
presented as a burlesque-i.e., actors walking on their hands-copied almost verbatim);
Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937)(defendants, making only minor
changes in format, appropriated entirety of plaintiff's directory); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 425
No. 1] 61
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play supporting roles in the determination of what use is fair.
Although case law speaks of subordinating economic incentive to
progress for the public good," as Professor Melville B. Nimmer
points out in his treatise on copyright, economic incentive for au-
thors in reality dominates the other considerations." While courts
sometimes choose to ignore aspects of economic reality,5 7 most
cases do in fact turn on the financial impact the copying has on the
copyright proprietor.
Courts determine economic harm by gauging the impact of the
defendant's use on the plaintiff's market." A showing of potential
damages suffices under copyright law to justify a judgment for the
copyright holder;" indeed, section 504 of the current Copyright
Act specifically provides for minimum statutory damages when ac-
tual damages cannot be proven." Historically, the key factor con-
sidered is whether the works fill the same need, thus resulting in
diminution of the plaintiff's potential profits." When the works
F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)(wrongful appropriation of copyrighted song); Elektra Records
Co. v. Gem Electronic Distributors, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821 (E.D.N.Y. 1973)(defendant's tape
service, inter alia, duplicated entirety of plaintiff's copyrighted tapes). But see Williams &
Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by an equally divided court,
420 U.S. 376 (1975)(entire articles copied from scientific journals).
55. See Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822
(1964).
56. "If one looks to the fair use cases, if not always to their stated rationale, this [section
107(4)] emerges as the most important, and indeed, central fair use factor." 3 NIMMER §
13.05 [A][4] at 13-61. See also STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., COPYRIGHT LAw REvISION, Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revi-
sion of the U.S. Copyright Law, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25 (Comm. Print 1961), wherein
the Register, discussing the factors later codified in section 107, states that "[t]hese criteria
are interrelated and their relative significance may vary, but the fourth one-the competi-
tive character of the use-is often the most decisive."
57. See discussion of Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States in text accompanying
notes 77-83, infra.
58. Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1914):
One test which when applicable, would seem to be ordinarily decisive, is
whether or not so much as [sic] has been reproduced as will materially reduce the
demand for the original. If it has, the rights of the owner of the copyright have
been injuriously affected. . . . The reduction in demand, to be a ground of com-
plaint, must result from the partial satisfaction of that demand by the alleged
infringing production.
See also Marvin Worth Productions v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1274
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), af'd by an equally
divided court sub nom. CBS, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
59. See note 82, infra, and accompanying text.
60. Section 504 was preceded by § 101(b) of the Copyright Act of 1909.
61. Addison-Wesley Pubi. Co. v. Brown, 223 F. Supp. 219, 222 (E.D.N.Y. 1963)(defen-
dant's publication of answers to problems in plaintiff's physics textbook would adversely
62 [Vol. 3
neither fulfill the same function nor compete in the same market,
fair use may be invoked." When they do, the fair use defense gen-
erally will not succeed."
Copies need not be in the same medium as the original to be
infringing. 4 For example, a motion picture based upon and sub-
stantially similar to a copyrighted play would constitute infringe-
ment. Even if exhibition of the film resulted in increased profits
for the play, a right reserved to the playwright-i.e., the right to
produce a film based on his or her play"5-would be infringed. It
matters not that the copyright proprietor has not as yet exercised
the right in question."
When courts believe unauthorized use of a copyright holder's
work damages the holder with no accompanying benefit to society,
the decision will be for the plaintiff. For example, in Henry Holt &
Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.,6 7 the defendant paraphrased
three sentences from the plaintiff's scientific treatise in an adver-
tising pamphlet. The district court held that the public's associa-
tion of the plaintiff with a cigarette advertisement could damage
affect collegiate adoption of the text); College Entrance Book Co. v. Amsco Book Co., 119
F.2d 874, 876 (2d Cir. 1941)(defendant's infringing French text held to meet "exactly the
same demand on the same market" and was thus an "unfair use").
62. Italian Book Corp. v. ABC, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)(defendant's film of
parade, shown on evening news, included footage of a float upon which a band was playing
plaintiff's copyrighted song); Mura v. CBS, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)(plaintiff's
puppets displayed on TV show); Berlin v. E. C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964) (parody lyrics of copyrighted songs printed in Mad
Magazine); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc., v. P.F. Collier & Son Co., 26 U.S.P.Q. 40
(1934)(defendant quoted song for background atmosphere in magazine story). But cf. Leo
Feist, Inc., v. Song Parodies, 146 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1944)(parodies of lyrics published in song
sheet held to compete in same market).
63. H. C. Wainwright & Co. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 418 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), af'd sub nom. Wainwright Securities Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d
91 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978)(defendant published abstracts of plain-
tiff's financial research reports); Marvin Worth Productions v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F.
Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)(defendant's film substantially copied Lenny Bruce's material);
New York Tribune v. Otis & Co., 39 F. Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)(reproduction of newspa-
per's title, editorial page masthead and leading editorial in rebuttal sent to customers);
Buck v. Crescent Gardens Operating Co., 28 F. Supp. 576 (D.C. Mass. 1939)(public perform-
ance of songs by orchestra).
64. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Cooperative Prods., Inc., 479 F.
Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1979)(play based on both novel and movie of "Gone With the Wind");
Douglas Int'l Corp. v. Baker, 335 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)(movie, play about Lenny
Bruce).
65. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
66. See Marvin Worth Prods. v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1274-75
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), quoting 3 NIMMER § 13.05[B] at 13-62.
67. 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
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his reputation and result in diminished sales of his book.
The fact that the unauthorized use is for an "approved" pur-
pose" does not guarantee freedom from liability. In Macmillan Co.
v. King," a teacher's incorporation of textual materials in outlines
prepared for his students was found unfair, despite its nonprofit
educational nature. The instructor's appropriation was deemed so
substantial that his outlines could replace student need for the
copyrighted textbook, diminishing the author's market.
Cases in which the unauthorized use of copyrighted material
benefits the public interest without concurrent harm to the copy-
right holder7 0 are readily resolved. In Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis
Associates," which involved the Zapruder film of President Ken-
nedy's assassination, the public's right to know7 ' overrode the
copyright proprietor's refusal of access to its material. The district
court specifically stated that use of the film in the defendant's
book would not economically harm the plaintiff's copyrighted mag-
azine articles.7 8 The fact that the defendant's work was commer-
cially published for profit did not negate the defense of fair use.
The remaining factors, subsections 107(2) and 107(3)," play
their strongest roles in cases such as Karll v. Curtis Publishing
Co., 7  where the copyrighted work does not particularly advance
the public good and the unauthorized use does not harm the copy-
right holder. In Karll, the defendant included lyrics from the cho-
68. See preamble to 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 107(1).
69. 223 F. 862 (D. Mass. 1914). See also Encyclopedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks,
447 F. Supp. 243, 252 (W.D.N.Y. 1978). The defendant, a nonprofit educational organiza-
tion, videotaped copyrighted educational films from television broadcasts and distributed
them to public schools. On a motion for preliminary injunction, the district court held that
the defendant's "highly organized and systematic program for reproducing videotapes on a
massive scale" was not fair use.
70. E.g., Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.
1966)(biography of Howard Hughes did not lessen value of plaintiff's copyrighted magazine
articles which defendant used in preparing biography).
71. 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data
Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D. N.J. 1977).
72. 293 F. Supp. at 146: "There is a public interest in having the fullest information avail-
able on the murder of President Kennedy. [The defendant] did serious work on the subject
and has a theory entitled to public consideration."
73. Id.
74. See also Karll v. Curtis Publ. Co., 39 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Wis. 1941)(see text accompa-
nying note 76, infra); Broadway Music Corp. v. F-R Publ. Corp., 31 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y.
1940)(chorus of a song associated with actress Pearl White included in article following her
death).
75. See text accompanying notes 53-54, supra.
76. 39 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Wis. 1941).
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rus of a song written for the Green Bay Packers in his magazine
article about the team. Because the primary factors were not deter-
minative of the issue of infringement, the district court based its
ruling of non-infringement on the lack of substantiality of the tak-
ing and the greatly different scope, nature and purpose of the
works.
The most difficult cases for the courts to decide are those where
the two primary factors demand opposite results-i.e., while the
use is one that furthers the progress of the arts and sciences, it is
accompanied by harm to the copyright holder which undermines
the system's economic incentive. A case in point is Williams &
Wilkins Co. v. United States," which dealt with the issue of large-
scale photocopying and copyright infringement. Williams & Wil-
kins, a publisher of medical and scientific journals, sued two gov-
ernmental agencies (the National Institutes of Health [NIH] and
the National Library of Medicine [NLM]) for alleged infringe-
ment. NIH and NLM held one or two subscriptions to various
journals. Both agencies admitted making vast numbers of copies of
scientific articles from the journals available upon request to re-
searchers and libraries and "lending" them with no obligation to
return.78 Library policy limited copies to one article, not exceeding
50 pages in length, from a given journal per request. However, so
long as the pages reproduced totaled less than 50 per cent of the
journal, copies of more than one article were allowed as a matter of
course.
Logic dictates that photocopying on so massive a scale could
have adverse effects on a plaintiffs market."1 Williams & Wilkins
Co. v. United States thus obliged the court to weigh the benefits to
science and the arts against the resulting harm to the copyright
holder's economic incentive to produce. However, by confusing
77. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
78. In 1970, NIH copied approximately 93,000 articles; in 1968, NLM copied approxi-
mately 127,000. 487 F.2d at 1348-49.
79. The Commissioner of the Court of Claims, whose ruling (172 U.S.P.Q. 670 (Comm'r
Ct. Cl. 1972)) in favor of the plaintiffs was subsequently overturned by the Court of Claims,
stated, "The photocopies are exact duplicates of the original articles; are intended to be
substitutes for, and serve the same purpose as, the original articles; and serve to diminish
plaintiff's potential market for the original articles since the photocopies are made at the
request of, and for the benefit of, the very persons who constitute plaintiff's market." 487
F.2d at 1378 (Cowen, C.J., dissenting).
It should be noted that the profit margins of the journals involved in this suit were only
approximately $1,000-15,000. Id. at 1357.
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damages with liability,80 the Court of Claims was able to sidestep
the question of the balance between the goal and the incentive of
copyright law and rule that the defendants' use of the plaintiff's
materials was fair. Presaging Judge Ferguson in Universal v. Sony,
the Court of Claims held that Williams & Wilkins had failed to
transform its hypothetical assumption of economic harm into
proven fact.8 ' The court's decision ignored Congressional intention
that actual damages need not be proven. It is precisely because
such damages are often difficult to demonstrate that section 504 of
the current Copyright Act provides minimum statutory damages of
not less than $250 or more than $10,000 for all infringements with
respect to any one work. It is only when a plaintiff's potential mar-
ket will not be adversely affected by general distribution of unlim-
ited copies of an allegedly infringing work by all possible defen-
dants and users that a finding of fair use is justified."
Therefore, the court should have asked not whether the specific
photocopying of the defendants damaged the plaintiff, but whether
unrestricted photocopying of the journals in question would dimin-
ish Williams & Wilkins' potential market. While occasional unau-
thorized reproductions of educational or scientific works may not
harm their authors, large-scale photocopying by schools and librar-
ies from single subscriptions would tremendously reduce the mar-
ket for such works. According to Professor Nimmer, such wholesale
copying "could well discourage authors from creating works of an
educational or scientific nature. It would surely discourage nongov-
ernmental publishers from publishing such works.""
While the decision in Williams & Wilkins turned on many dif-
ferent factors, of primary interest here is the court's insistence
that one must prove actual damages to defeat the fair use defense.
This ruling allowed expansion of the doctrine to include extensive
80. See 3 NIMMER § 13.05[E][c] at 13-84.
81. 487 F.2d at 1359.
82. 3 NIMMER § 13.05[E] [c] at 13-84. See also Nimmer, Photocopying and Record Piracy:
Of Dred Scott and Alice in Wonderland, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1052, 1053 (1975); Loew's Inc.
v. CBS, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165, 184 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd sub nom., Benny v. Loew's Inc.,
239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by an equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958): "The
mere absence of competition or injurious effect upon the copyrighted work will not make a
use fair. The right of a copyright proprietor to exclude others is absolute and if it has been
violated the fact that the infringement will not affect the sale or exploitation of the work or
pecuniarily damage him is immaterial."
83. Nimmer, supra note 82, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. at 1054.
84. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 449-50 (C.D.
Cal. 1979). See also 3 NIMMER § 13.05[E][c] at 13-86.
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photocopying, ostensibly necessary to the medical community," of
readily available copyrighted material. Affirmed by an equally di-
vided Supreme Court, the holding in Williams & Wilkins is "spe-
cifically limited to its unique factual situation" and is of little prec-
edential value." However, Judge Ferguson in Universal v. Sony
made use of the case to demonstrate the viability of the "fair use
doctrine when copyright protection is tested by new technology
and noncommercial use."" Both Williams & Wilkins and Sony
value public access over economic incentive.
III
Universal v. Sony
Universal v. Sony further expanded the doctrine of fair use to
allow justification of the total appropriation of protected material
not subsequently incorporated in copyrightable works. Universal
pointed to the fact that the home videotaper produces an exact
copy of that which he or she copies rather than an original work.
Propounding the traditional view that assertion of the fair use de-
fense requires independent research or creativity," the studio ar-
gued that Betamax users copy only for convenience and entertain-
ment and so are consumers rather than users of copyrighted
works. 9 Universal claimed that "'[u]se' is an essential element in
the creation of new works . . . 'consumption' serves to promote the
arts and sciences only when the compensation paid by the con-
sumer contributes to the reward of the original author." 0
Universal also relied on the established rule that copying of en-
tire works is never protected by the fair use doctrine,91 and, in dis-
cussing the doctrine, emphasized the usually decisive economic fac-
tor,"2 i.e., "[t]he effect of the use upon the potential market for or
85. But see 3 NIMMER § 13.05[E][c] at 13-85.
86. 480 F. Supp. at 450.
87. Id.
88. "The fair use doctrine allows subsequent authors to use the original copyrighted work
as a tool in their own creative efforts." Plaintiffs' Preliminary Pre-Trial Memorandum of
Points and Authorities at 43-44. See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366
F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966); Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974); Norman v. CBS, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 788
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), af'd by an equally
divided court sub nom. Loew's Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
89. Plaintiffs' Preliminary Pre-Trial Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 44.
90. Id. (emphasis in original).
91. Id. at 45-48. See note 54, supra.
92. See note 56, supra, and accompanying text.
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value of the copyrighted work":
[I]f a single Betamax owner makes an unauthorized copy of one
of plaintiffs' copyrighted motion pictures, he is not likely thereaf-
ter to pay to see it when it is re-released in theaters, or offered for
sale on pre-recorded videodiscs or videotapes, or offered for lease
on 16mm prints. Nor is he likely to watch it again on television,
thus diminishing the size of the repeat and re-run television audi-
ence upon which plaintiffs rely to attain a profit from their tele-
vised copyrighted motion pictures.8
Sony argued that Congress has determined that such home view-
ing is reasonable "by refusing to grant the owners of the copyrights
[in copyrighted theatrical and television pictures] the right to bar
such viewing, i.e., by granting them only the right of public-not
private-performance."" Sony also asserted that the viewing was
reasonable on the grounds that the public airwaves were used in
broadcasting the programs into private homes, that such viewing
furthered the public interest in receiving information and ideas,
and that it carried out the purpose for which the programs were
broadcast into the homes, i.e., "Betamax . . . enable(s) the viewer
to receive precisely what plaintiffs have communicated to him over
the public airwaves.""
93. Plaintiffs' Preliminary Pre-Trial Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 55.
Copyright proprietors necessarily recoup production costs and realize profits in the rerun
market: "[T]he great financial expenditures for production of first run television motion
pictures [from $400,000 to $1,000,000 for a one hour television series episode and from
$2,000,000 to $25,000,000 for a theatrical motion picture] are not recouped unless and until
such motion pictures can be exploited in subsequent television re-run markets." Plaintiffs'
Opening Post-Trial Memorandum at 1, 2. See also Note, Home Videorecording: Fair Use or
Infringement?, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 573, 580 (1979).
94. Defendants' Memorandum of Contentions of Fact and Law (Trial Memorandum) at
99.
17 U.S.C. § 101 states that:
To "perform" a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either di-
rectly or by means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or
other audio visual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds
accompanying it audible.
To perform or display a work "publicly" means: (1) to perform or display it at a
place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons
outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to
a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process,
whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or dis-
play receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or
different times.




Universal, on the other hand, contended that the statutory lan-
guage of subsection 106(1) granting the copyright proprietor un-
qualified and exclusive right "to reproduce the copyrighted works
in copies or phonorecords"" was clear on its face. The studio
maintained that had Congress intended to allow home-use copying,
it would have made express qualifications such as those in subsec-
tions (4) and (5) of section 106." However, the district court
agreed with Sony's view that the Copyright Act was not to be in-
terpreted so literally. Judge Ferguson, citing the Supreme Court in
Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group," noted that
legislative history may properly be used to aid in statutory inter-
pretation, "however clear the words may appear on 'superficial ex-
amination.' "" He stated that while the language in section 106 is
broad and general, and apparently applicable to all situations
which concern reproduction of copyrighted works, the section does
not reflect the attention Congress gave to specific categories of re-
production. The judge concluded that "[a]s the legislative history
shows, Congress did not always draft statutory language to reflect
its intent."100
Two of the allegedly infringing recordings in Universal v. Sony
were made after January 1, 1978 and are governed by the Copy-
right Act of 1976;101 all others were made prior to that date and are
governed by the Copyright Act of 1909.102 After reviewing both
Acts, and the legislative history of the Act of 1976, Judge Ferguson
held that home-use recording is not an infringement under either
Act. He held further that home-use copying is fair use under
both. 03
It is submitted that once Judge Ferguson determined that home-
use recording was not an infringement under either Act, his finding
of fair use was unnecessary. The doctrine is a defense to a charge
of copying; it is employed to justify use of a copyrighted work
without the consent of its owner. A judicial determination that no
wrongful taking of a copyrighted work has occurred obviates the
need for a ruling that the taking was fair.
96. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
97. See text accompanying note 30, supra.
98. 426 U.S. 1 (1976).
99. 480 F. Supp. at 443, quoting 426 U.S. at 10.
100. Id.





While Judge Ferguson could have based his decision solely on
statutory interpretation and legislative history, his application of
fair use to home videotaping broadened that doctrine to cover the
duplication of entire works which are not incorporated into subse-
quent creations themselves eligible for copyright. Although this
holding is limited to the sphere of home use,'" another court could
decide that such a taking exceeds the bounds of fair use. And
should home-use copying be judged an infringing act, Sony in turn
could be held liable: while charges of direct infringement and vica-
rious liability would doubtless fail, a strong case could be made for
contributory infringement.
It will be shown, however, that this result-liability for the home
copier and subsequent liability for the manufacturer-was never
intended either by Congress or the Copyright Office. Indeed, it is
the clearly-stated intent of both of these bodies that noncommer-
cial home videotaping be exempt from liability. It is therefore sug-
gested that proper resolution of the problem requires further legis-
lation rather than judicial decision.
Direct Infringement
Universal charged Sony with direct infringement on the theory
that Sony advertised and sold the Betamax videorecorder in-
tending that it be used for infringing purposes.105 While one can be
a direct infringer without participating in the infringing activity,
the cases upon which Universal relied involved far more substan-
tial and direct involvement in the infringing activity than that al-
leged in Universal v. Sony. In Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers,'" for
example, a filmmaker who produced and advertised an infringing
movie was held liable for the public exhibition of 'the movie by
others. In Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Electronic Distributors,
Inc.,107 defendants ran a business which sold blank tapes to cus-
tomers who then copied pre-recorded copyrighted tapes loaned
without charge by the. defendants on defendants' coin-operated re-
corders. Sony, on the other hand, neither produced the copy-
righted works in question nor provided them to its customers.
104. Id. at 442.
105. Plaintiffs' Opening Post-Trial Memorandum at 11.
106. 222 U.S. 55 (1911).
107. 360 F. Supp. 821 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). Note that contrary to the facts in Elektra, Sony's
Betamax and blank tapes can be used for non-infringing purposes (see note 115, infra). In




Rather, the works were licensed by the copyright proprietors for
broadcast free of charge over the public airwaves.
As Judge Ferguson pointed out, neither the manufacturers of the
film or camera used to produce the infringing movie in Kalem, nor
the manufacturer of the recorder in Elektra were sued.108 On this
basis he concluded that there was no precedent for finding the cor-
porate defendants in Sony liable for direct infringement.109
Vicarious Liability
The theory of vicarious liability is grounded in the doctrine of
respondeat superior: an employer is liable for the acts of an em-
ployee acting within the scope of his or her employment, even
when the employer does not intend the act and/or has no knowl-
edge of it, or when the employee is acting in violation of his or her
employer's orders.110 One who hires an independent contractor1 1
could be liable for the latter's acts, despite the contractual agree-
ment between them whereby the employer relinquishes control
over the independent contractor's actions." Also, with direct ap-
108. 480 F. Supp. at 459.
109. Id.
110. Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962)(church liable when choir director, act-
ing in course and scope of employment, infringed copyrighted hymn); KECA Music, Inc. v.
Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72 (W.D. Mo. 1977)(owner of cocktail lounge and restau-
rant liable for unauthorized performances of copyrighted songs, despite his orders that only
original.compositions be played); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Veltin, 47 F. Supp. 648 (W.D.
La. 1942)(the fact that dancehall owner posted signs in his dancehall stating that he did not
want plaintiff's songs performed there did not exempt him from liability when, despite his
express orders to the contrary, the orchestra performed the musical compositions.)
111. "An independent contractor is one who renders service in the course of an indepen-
dent employment or occupation, following his employer's desires only as to the results of the
work, and not as to the means whereby it is to be accomplished." McDonald v. Shell Oil Co.,
44 Cal. 2d 785, 788, 285 P.2d 902, 903 (1955); Sparks v. L.D. Folsom Co., 217 Cal. App. 2d
279, 284, 31 Cal. Rptr. 640, 643 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958).
112. In Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Assoc., Inc.,
423 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1976), af'd 554 F.2d 1213 (1st Cir. 1977), the owners of a race
track were deemed to have acquiesced in independent contractors' performance of infringing
compositions because they allowed the musicians to select the program. The court noted:
"The courts have rejected [lack of liability on] the 'independent contractor' theory, and with
good reason. The proprietor of a public establishment operated for a profit could otherwise
reap the benefits of countless violations by orchestras, itinerant or otherwise, by merely
claiming ignorance that any violation would take place." 554 F.2d at 1214-15 (citations
omitted). In Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir.
1929), dancehall owners were held liable for an orchestra's infringement, despite a contract
with the orchestra leader giving them no voice in his selection of music or musicians. See
also Chess Music, Inc. v. Sipe, 442 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Minn. 1977); Harms v. Cohen, 279 F.
276 (E.D. Pa. 1922).
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plication to the allegations in Universal v. Sony, liability may be
imposed on a defendant despite absence of any employer-employee
or employer-independent contractor relationship."II Specifically,
vicarious liability can be imposed where, despite lack of intent to
infringe or knowledge of the infringement, the defendant has the
right to supervise the infringer's activities and has a direct
financial interest in those activities.1 14
Clearly, these latter requirements-right of supervision and
direct financial interest in the infringing activities-were not met
in Sony. Sony possesses neither the right nor the ability to super-
vise the public's use of Betamax in the privacy of the home. Also,
Sony's financial interest in the sale of its recorders and tapes is not
limited to the allegedly infringing activity and, in any event, is not
direct. Sony benefits from the sale of its machines and tapes, re-
gardless of their subsequent use, some of which is undeniably non-
infringing.11
The district court dismissed as unfeasible Universal's proposals
that Sony "supervise" home recording by developing a jamming
system to block the TV signals of copyrighted materials,"' as well
113. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963)(storeowner
who retained the right to supervise concessionaire's conduct and received percentage of con-
cessionaire's gross sales of phonograph records was vicariously liable for sales of infringing
records, despite lack of knowledge or intent to infringe); Davis v. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 240 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)(sponsor and advertising agency of TV program pro-
duced by others liable for infringement when the sponsors, or their agents, were called upon
to approve various stages of the production, and the sponsor had the ultimate power to
choose the content of the program).
114. 316 F.2d at 307.
115. Some programs broadcast over the public airwaves are not copyrightable. For exam-
ple, publications (under the old Act, ch. 391, § 8, 61 Stat. 652 (1947)) or works (under the
new Act, 17 U.S.C. § 105) of the United States government, courtroom and Congressional
proceedings and Presidential news conferences are not subject to copyright protection. Live
telecasts which are not simultaneously taped (i.e., fixed in a tangible medium of expression)
are not covered by copyright (see 17 U.S.C. § 102), nor are foreign films not copyrighted in
the United States. Also, there are some 20,000 motion pictures in the public domain, many
of which are broadcast on television. Some programs are not protected because steps neces-
sary to obtain copyright have been neglected; others, though protected by copyright, are
available for public recording because their owners have no objections to such recording.
Major League Football, the National Football League, the National Basketball Association
and the National Hockey League Network do not object to the videotaping of sports events
between teams owned by their members. Many educational and religious broadcasters have
testified that they do not object to home recording. See Defendants' Memorandum of Facts
and Law (Trial Memorandum) at 8-9.
116. "Plaintiffs contend that defendants have [the] power to supervise home recording of
copyrighted works. They suggest that defendants could develop a jamming system to pre-
vent recording of anything copyrighted. Whether or not such jamming is technologically
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as the suggestion that Betamax be sold without its recording ele-
ment.1 17 Judge Ferguson flatly rejected the possibility that Sony's
"supervision" take the form of discontinued sale of the video-
recorder. To expand the doctrine so far beyond precedent would,
he said, potentially "bring many manufacturers, advertisers and
retailers into the net of vicarious liability.""' Business people who
benefit from the sale of staple items capable of both infringing and
non-infringing uses, such as cameras and photocopiers, should not
be required to exercise such a method of regulation. 119
In conclusion, Sony's participation in and benefit from home re-
cording of copyrighted works is not sufficient to render it vicari-
ously liable, even if such recording were initially held an
infringement.
Contributory Infringement
While Judge Ferguson's rulings on direct infringement and vica-
rious liability are sound, the issue of contributory infringement
poses a much closer question. Although Universal v. Sony was de-
cided in favor of the corporate defendants, another court, on the
same facts, could justifiably find for the plaintiffs.
A contributory infringer is "one who, with knowledge of the in-
fringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the
infringing conduct of another. . . ."1o Universal maintained that
the manufacturing, advertising, demonstrating and selling of
Betamax purposefully led to the infringing conduct of others 21
and rendered Sony a contributory infringer. In addition, the studio
cited cases12' holding that liability for contributory infringement
feasible, this 'supervision' would not be within the power of these defendants. A jamming
system would most likely require the cooperation of many others: broadcasters, producers
and perhaps the Federal Communications Commission." 480 F. Supp. at 461-62.
117. "Plaintiffs also assert that defendants could remove the tuner from the Betamax and
thereby make it impossible to record off-the-air. Even if defendants were required to do
this, however, an outboard tuner could be purchased separately." Id. at 462. See also state-
ment of Register of Copyrights quoted infra, at note 147.
118. 480 F. Supp. at 462.
119. Id.
120. Gershwin Publ. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971); see also Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F.
Supp 399, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)(defendant's motion for summary judgment denied); 327 F.
Supp. 788 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)(judgment for plaintiffs), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Screen
Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Metlis & Lebow Corp., 453 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1972).
121. Plaintiffs' Opening Post-Trial Memorandum at 22.
122. Gershwin Publ. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir.
1971) and Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399
No. 1]1 HOME USE 73
COMM/ENT LAW JOURNAL
could be found in the absence of inducement if the defendants sig-
nificantly contributed to the infringing acts of others.*3
Through depositions and in-court testimony, Universal intro-
duced abundant evidence to show that Sony executives were aware
that the Betamax's primary use would be to record copyrighted
works televised into the home, and that they knew that such re-
cording constituted copyright infringement.12 ' The studio con-
tended that even if Sony lacked knowledge of the specific works
that would be copied, its awareness that people would use
Betamax to record copyrighted works in itself constituted con-
structive knowledge."'
Judge Ferguson, however, accepted Sony's argument: It had
never been determined prior to the instant lawsuit whether non-
commercial home videotaping was an infringing activity; therefore,
Sony lacked the knowledge necessary to make it a contributory in-
fringer. He noted that in the cases cited by Universal, Gershwin
Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc.1"6 and
Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc.,127
the "requisite knowledge is greater than that possessed by the cor-
porate defendants here," 2 8 and that "no employee [of the defen-
dant] had either direct involvement with the allegedly infringing
activity or direct contact with purchasers of Betamax who recorded
copyrighted works off-the-air."12  He simply ignored Universal's
contention, supported by Gershwin and Screen Gems, that induce-
ment is not a necessary element of contributory infringement. 0
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
123. Plaintiffs' Opening Post-Trial Memorandum at 21.
124. For example, Sony had affixed warnings to its pre-Betamax videorecorders stating
that the machines were not to be used to record copyrighted material. At the time of the
lawsuit, a warning regarding the questionable permissibility of recording copyrighted mate-
rial was included on the last page of an instruction booklet which Betamax purchasers re-
ceived in the sealed carton containing the recorder. The Betamax warranty stated that
"there shall be no liability on the part of the manufacturer, distributor or seller for any loss
or damage arising directly or indirectly from the use of the Betamax." 480 F. Supp. at 436.
Because of its concern regarding the legality of copying protected materials, Sony's advertis-
ing agency, Doyle Dane Bernbach, Inc., asked for and received indemnification before agree-
ing to run the Betamax sales campaign. Id.
125. Id. at 460.
126. 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
127. 256 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
128. 480 F. Supp. at 459.
129. Id. at 460.
130. The judge stated that "[ilt is also doubtful that these defendants have met the other




The judge noted that while Universal introduced into evidence
many nationwide ads urging the public to "build a [tape] library"
by "recordling] favorite shows," "novels for television" and "classic
movies,"131 it offered no proof that any of the advertisements or
statements made by the defendants induced or caused the specific
copies at issue to be made."' He stressed that "[c]ommerce would
indeed be hampered if manufacturers of staple items were held lia-
ble as contributory infringers whenever they 'constructively' knew
that some purchasers on some occasions would use their product
for a purpose which a court later deemed, as a matter of first im-
pression, to be an infringement.""as
It is submitted that another court could reach a contrary result
when deciding these questions of fact. Logic, if not judicial proof,
indicates that the corporate defendants knew of and encouraged
the copying of prime time copyrighted works. Common sense dic-
tates that Sony knowingly developed and marketed the Betamax
for just such a use. Recording of televised copyrighted material is
hardly an unanticipated use of home videorecorders. Interrogato-
ries and admissions to the parties and questionnaires to the public
addressed to issues generated by Universal v. Sony could establish
the defendants' involvement in this aspect of the case.
Judge Ferguson placed great emphasis on Universal's failure to
prove existing harm,13" and, as Professor Nimmer points out, his
decision "was couched in such form as to leave open the possibility
that at some later time a court might reach a contrary conclusion
on [that] issue. . . ."" In this regard, it should be noted that Uni-
versal has now begun marketing its multi-million dollar videodisc
system in selected cities.1 While the grounds upon which the stu-
dio based its claim of harm in Universal v. Sony as yet remain
speculative,'1 7 study of the videodisc market should afford statisti-
131. Id. at 436.
132. Id. at 459, 460.
133. Id. at 461.
134. While Universal presented extensive expert testimony as to prospective harm, its
witnesses were unable to predict at what time the harm would occur. Id. at 440, 451-52, 465-
69.
135. 3 NIMMER § 13.05[F][5] at 13-98.
136. See Schuyten, The TV: More to View With Tapes and Discs, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17,
1980, § III at 1, col. 3. Reprinted as On the Precipice of the Big Video Revolution in S.F.
Chronicle Datebook, March 23, 1980, at 39-40.
137. Universal contended that it would suffer harm from the following uses of the
Betamax: 1) Recording material off-the-air but never viewing the copy (allegedly a per se
violation of copyright law); 2) Time-Shifting, i.e., recording off-the-air while not viewing the
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cal data concerning the effects- of home-use taping on the sale of
such discs. The studio then may be able to assert and prove actual
harm.
Finally, it is conceivable that another court might decide, on
facts identical to those in Sony, that noncommercial home vide-
otaping by its very nature falls outside the bounds of fair use. If
home use was held to be an infringing act,138 Sony, as demon-
strated above, could be vulnerable to a charge of contributory in-
fringement. Yet one need only examine the legislative history of
the Copyright Act of 1976 to determine that such a finding would
run counter to the intention of both Congress and the Copyright
Office.
Legislative History
In 1955 Congress began revising the Copyright Act of 1909.
From 1955 to 1976, the Copyright Office worked with Congress in
an eff6rt to draft the new legislation. Many complexities, especially
strong disagreement regarding treatment of cable television,
delayed completion of the revision."3 9 In 1971, the problem of re-
cord piracy was deemed so severe that the Sound Recording
Amendment, 4 0 declaring such piracy a copyright infringement,' 4 '
program, watching the copy within a short period of time and erasing it thereafter; 3)
Librarying: Recording off-the-air and saving the tape for more than one subsequent viewing;
and 4) Avoiding commercials either by using the pause button while recording or by fast-
forwarding while playing back. 480 F. Supp. at 465.
Plaintiffs assert that these uses of the Betamax will "decrease the value of their copy-
rights . . . by exhausting interest in reruns and by fragmenting the live television audience."
Id. at 440.
138. Should home-use videotaping be declared an infringing activity, some system for
public payment of royalties would have to be fashioned. While it would be unrealistic and
unduly intrusive to attempt to assess copying in the home, it should be noted that at least
one workable system for collecting royalties on televised material-fees imposed on the sale
of videorecorders and tapes-already exists abroad, e.g., in West Germany. See Note, Home
Videorecording: Fair Use or Infringement?, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 573, 626-27 (1978-79). The
United States Copyright Act of 1976 established compulsory licensing of cable television (17
U.S.C. § 111(d)); should the legislature enact a similar scheme for videorecorders, proce-
dures already operative for cable TV could be extended to VTRs. Consumers then could be
required to pay a surcharge on purchases of videorecorders and/or videotapes. The revenue
could be delivered to the Register of Copyrights for deposit in the United States Treasury.
The Copyright Royalty Tribunal could distribute the funds to copyright proprietors of
works broadcast into private homes. Such a system could eliminate the practical problems
implicit in finding home videotapers to be copyright infringers and assure copyright proprie-
tors a fair reward for their creative labor.
139. 480 F. Supp. at 443-44. See letter from Librarian of Congress to the Chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, SENATE REPORT No. 72, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 8 (1971).
140. Enacted October 15, 1971, the Sound Recording Amendment, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85
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was incorporated into the Copyright Act of 1909. The amendment,
incorporating language from earlier revision bills, would not have
been necessary had the general revision not been held up by the
controversy over cable television. That the amendment was later
incorporated almost word for word into the Act of 1976 is notewor-
thy, for, as the House Report accompanying the 1971 amendment
points out, the creation of a limited copyright in sound recording
was aimed at curtailing commercial record piracy. Noting that
noncommercial home recording is both common and unrestrained,
the report states "[s]pecifically, it is not the intention of the Com-
mittee to restrain the home recording, from broadcasts or from
tapes or records, of recorded performances, where the home re-
cording is for private use and with no purpose of reproducing or
otherwise capitalizing commercially on it.""".
Home-use recording of radio and television broadcasts received
attention from committee hearings, floor debates and the Copy-
right Office. The House Report concerning the Sound Amendment
reveals that body's awareness of the technological revolution tak-
ing place in the world and concern that new legislation not deny its
fruits-e.g., videotape recorders-to the private sector. 4 3  The
hearings demonstrate the clear intent of Congress to curtail com-
mercial piracy while exempting noncommercial home copying
Stat. 391-92, which was incorporated into the Copyright Act of 1909 as § 1(f), was continued
in the current Copyright Act as § 114. Prior to the amendment's February 15, 1972, effective
date, sound recordings were not eligible for copyright protection. See 2 NIMMER § 7.06[B].
For sound recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972, see 1 NIMMER § 2.10[B].
141. The amendment protected manufacturers of sound recordings by giving them the
exclusive right to duplicate the sound recordings, prepare derivative copies (i.e., rearrange
the actual sounds embodied in the recording) and distribute phonorecords to the public by
sale, lease, rental or loan.
142. H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., let Sess. 7 (1971)(emphasis added).
143. Senator Philip Hart of Michigan, expressing concern regarding the vagueness of the
bill, stated:
The [copyright] "author" is granted the exclusive right to "reproduce and dis-
tribute to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending, reproductions of the copyrighted work." A proviso limits the right of re-
production to the duplication of the sound recording in a "tangible form that di-
rectly or indirectly recaptures the actual sounds fixed in the recording." The com-
mittee report does not define the reach of this grant of exclusivity to reproduce
and distribute. How much further the right extends beyond exclusion of a "pi-
rate" to reproduce an exact copy on a disc or tape is not clear. In a field of rapid
technological change we should be careful not to erect barriers to the evolution of
technology.
117 CONG. REc. 12764 (1971)(emphasis added).
144. The intent of Congress to strike at commercial piracy was articulated by Representa-
tive Robert W. Kastenmeier of Wisconsin. Rep. Kastenmeier was Chairman of, the House
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from liability for infringement."1 It is therefore evident that while
the language of section 106 of the current Copyright Act appears to
give copyright proprietors exclusive rights to their recordings, Con-
gress did not intend to prohibit noncommercial home-use sound
recording. The legislative history supports as well Sony's conten-
tion that while the current Copyright Act does not expressly pro-
tect home-use audiovisual recording, Congressional intent places it
on the same ground as sound recording.
In July, 1961, in a report to Congress on revision of the copy-
right laws, the Register of Copyrights stated, "[n]ew technical de-
vices will probably make it practical in the future to reproduce
televised motion pictures in the home. We do not believe the pri-
vate use of such a reproduction can or should be precluded by cop-
yright." 146 This viewpoint was reaffirmed in 1971 during hearings
before Subcommittee Three of the House Committee on the Judi-
ciary regarding the Sound Recording Amendment when then As-
sistant Register (now Register) of Copyrights, Barbara Ringer, in
an exchange with Representative Edward G. Biester, Jr. of Penn-
sylvania, reiterated that the Copyright Office had no wish to inter-
Judiciary Subcommittee responsible for the current Copyright Act and was a sponsor of the
general revision legislation and a member of the Conference Committee which put the cur-
rent Act into its final form. He noted: "The creation of a limited copyright in sound record-
ings as is done by S. 646 offers a rational solution [to the piracy problem]. . . . The commit-
tee similarly believes that the interest of the producers of sound recordings in freeing their
product of piracy-defining piracy as the unauthorized commercial duplication and sale of
a sound recording-warrants legislative effectuation and support." Id. at 34748 (emphasis
added).
Senator John L. McClellan spoke of the necessity for the measure as follows: "The recent
rapid increase in the unauthorized commercial duplication of legitimate recordings has be-
come a serious problem both in this country and abroad. . . . By granting a limited copy-
right in sound recordings this legislation will make a major contribution to the suppression
of this unethical and unfair business competition." Id. at 12763 (emphasis added).
145. The question of noncommercial use was raised by Texas Representative Abraham
Kazen, Jr. and answered by Representative Kastenmeier:
MR. KAZEN. Am I correct in assuming that the bill protects copyrighted material
that is duplicated for commercial purposes only?
MR. KASTENMEIER. Yes.
MR. KAZEN. In other words, if your child were to record off of a program which
comes through the air on the radio or television, and then used it for her own
personal pleasure, for listening pleasure, this use would not be included under the
penalties of this bill?
Ma. KASTENMEIER. This is not included in the bill. I am glad the gentleman
raises the point.
Id. at 34748-49 (emphasis added).
146. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 18T SESS. COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAw 30 (Comm. Print 1961).
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fere with home videotaping or to force legislation that would pro-
hibit the development or manufacture of home videotaping
equipment." 7  Ms. Ringer specifically stated that copyrighted
materials were not protected from private, noncommercial home
taping under Federal statute.1 48
The bill which became the Copyright Act of 1976, S. 22, was in-
troduced and reported by Senator John L. McClellan," 9 who was
also the author of S. 626 which became the 1971 Sound Amend-
ment.150 The House counterpart of Senator McClellan's bill'51 was
presented by Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman of
the House Subcommittee which held hearings on the many general
revision drafts as well as the 1971 Sound Recording Amendment.
Senator McClellan and Representative Kastenmeier were mem-
147. MR. BIESTER. . . . I can tell you I must have a small pirate in my own home.
My son has a cassette tape recorder, and as a particular record becomes a hit,
he will retrieve it onto his little set.
Now, he may retrieve in addition something else onto his recording, but none-
theless, he does retrieve the basic sound, and this legislation, of course, would not
point to his activities, would it?
Miss RINGER. I think the answer is clearly, "No, it would not."
I have spoken at a couple of seminars on video cassettes lately, and this ques-
tion is usually asked: "What about the home recorders?"
The answer I have given and will give again is that this is something you cannot
control.
You simply cannot control it.
I do not see anybody going into anyone's home and preventing this sort of
thing, or forcing legislation that would engineer a piece of equipment not to al-
low home taping.
MR. BIESTER. Secondly, with respect to video cassettes, are we approaching an
additional problem, not with respect to private use, but with respect to public
distribution after it has been retrieved over a home set?
Miss RINGER. The answer is very definitely, "Yes."
For years the motion picture industry has been faced with bootlegging
problems, much of it deriving from the 16 mm. prints that were distributed to the
Armed Forces and got out of control. The film industry has had a very active
policing activity for years.
I think that this problem is going to undergo a quantum increase when video
cassette recorders are freely available. But I would say that there is a big differ-
ence, and I think it is something that you might consider. In that area, they have
got copyright protection, and in this area, who knows? It is certainly not protect-
able under the Federal Statute.
Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings: Hearings Before Subcomm. Three of the Comm.
on the Judiciary, House of Representatives on S.646 and H.R. 6927, 92d Cong., 1st Sesas.
22-23 (1971)(emphasis added).
148. See text accompanying notes 143-45, supra, and note 145, supra.
149. S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., lst Sess. (1975).
150. Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391-92 (1971) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 114).
151. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
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bers of the Conference Committee which put the Copyright Act of
1976 into its final form, and each submitted the Conference Report
to his branch of Congress. Surely the legislative history of the cur-
rent Act would reflect any intention on their part to extend pro-
scription of commercial recording of broadcast works to private,
noncommercial recording. Instead, the history demonstrates con-
currence with the policy of the Copyright Office, which itself ac-
tively participated in drafting and explaining the Copyright Act of
1976 for Congress and consistently maintained that home-use re-
cording was not copyright infringement." As Judge Ferguson con-
cluded in Universal v. Sony, "legislative history shows that, in bal-
ance, Congress did not find that protection of copyright holders'
rights over reproduction of their works was worth the privacy and
enforcement problems which restraint of home-use recording
would create." 58
Conclusion
The decision in Universal v. Sony was based in large part upon a
determination that noncommercial home videotaping was fair use.
Judge Ferguson's holding on fair use, while not essential to a find-
ing that home use was exempt from liability, expanded the doc-
trine of fair use to include the copying of protected works in their
entirety-not as components of new and original works copyright-
able in themselves, but as exact duplicates of that which was cop-
ied. While the decision realized the intentions of both Congress
and the Copyright Office that home use be exempt from liability
for infringement, it did so by creating an exception to the estab-
lished criterion that fair use should not include the complete or
significantly substantial borrowing of copyrighted materials. The
movement toward so liberal an interpretation of fair use is signifi-
cant and calls for serious reflection on the origins and intent of the
doctrine. While th'e defense of fair use was created to grant greater
public access to copyrighted works, it is doubtful whether in the
absence of an urgent overriding public consideration such access
ever was intended to eclipse the rights of copyright proprietors.
Despite the fact that the district court in Universal v. Sony
reached a desirable result, the issue of liability for noncommercial
home copying should be removed from the judicial arena for two
152. 480 F. Supp. at 446.
153. Id.
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reasons: 1) to preserve the spirit and intent of the fair use doctrine;
and 2) to ensure that future cases posing facts similar or identical
to Sony are not decided against the home videotaper with subse-
quent liability attaching to the corporate defendants.
The problems created by home use of copyrighted materials re-
quire amendment of the Copyright Act to incorporate the home-
use exemption implied in its legislative history. Judge Ferguson
recognized and addressed this point with respect to areas of video-
recorder technology untouched by Sony. His observations apply as
well to the problems he considered resolved by his application of
the fair use doctrine: "Like the Court in Williams & Wilkins, this
court recognizes that the full resolution of these issues is 'preemi-
nently a problem for Congress: . . . Obviously there is much to be
said on all sides. The choices involve economic, social and policy
factors which are far better sifted by a legislature. The possible
intermediate solutions are also of the pragmatic kind legislatures,
not courts, can and should fashion.' "154
154. Id. at 469.
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